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I. Introduction
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, a loose-knit 18-member regional
institution, could assume a more pivotal role in the integration of the Pacific Rim, a market for more
than 60 percent of U.S. agriculture and food exports.  In 1994 APEC announced its ABogor
Declaration@, a plan to achieve free-trade in  2010 for developed members and 2020 for other
members.  Its free-trade plan calls for Aopen regionalism,@ allowing benefits from trade liberalization
undertaken by members to accrue not only to APEC members but to non-APEC members as well.
What is APEC?--The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is made up of 18
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diverse Pacific Rim economies (table 1), including the United States, and represents a significant
regional market for U.S. food and agriculture trade.  In FY 1997, the APEC region accounted for more
than 60 percent of U.S. agriculture and food exports and 50 percent of imports.   It also accounted for
practically all the growth in U.S. non-bulk exports in the past 10 years.  The region covers North
America, East Asia including China, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and only Chile in South America.
The APEC has a relatively short history, initiated in 1989.  It is an outgrowth of other loose-knit
fledgling Pacific Rim institutions, the most influential being the business-oriented Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC) that was founded in 1980 by Australia and Japan.
Growth in intra-APEC farm trade so far not attributable to the APEC institution--In the
APEC region, intra-regional agricultural trade, a measure of integration, has grown significantly in the
last 15 years. The APEC region now rivals the EU with respect to intra-regional agricultural trade; 68
percent of APEC=s agricultural exports in 1995 went to other members of APEC, compared with
almost 70 percent in the EU, and the share has been rising steadily.  But this integration so far is not
attributable to the APEC institution.  Rather it is driven by economic growth, policy reform, and the
freer play of comparative advantage independent of the APEC institution.  Economic growth in the
region has outpaced the world average by about 30 percent for the past 10 years.  Many APEC
economies around the Pacific Rim have liberalized both domestic farm policies and agricultural trade,
sometimes on their own initiative, and sometimes as the outcome of bilateral, regional, or multilateral
trade negotiations independent of the APEC institution.  Examples are NAFTA (1994), Closer
Economic Relations between Australia and New Zealand (1983), unilateral reforms undertaken by
New Zealand initiated in 1984, ASEAN=s free trade agreement (1994), Uruguay Round Agreement
implementation, and a number of bilateral agreements, notably the Japan-U.S. beef and citrus
agreement (1988).2
The Bogor Declaration of 1994--APEC could assume a far more pivotal role in the future
process of Pacific Rim integration than it has since its inception  in 1989.  About six months after the
signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement, APEC leaders issued their "Declaration of Common
Resolve@ in Bogor, Indonesia, on November 15, 1994,  announcing that members would adopt the
long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Pacific Rim region. This goal would be
pursued by  reducing barriers to trade and investment and by promoting the free flow of goods,
services, and capital within the region.
APEC members pledged to pursue regional free trade on a Most Favored Nation (MFN) basis
and to promote "open regionalism,"  allowing benefits from trade liberalization undertaken by members
 also to accrue to non-members.   Developed economies would fully liberalize their economies by 2010
and other members by 2020.  At the Osaka Ministerial in  November 1995, APEC members reaffirmed
the free trade goal, calling for comprehensive treatment, including controversial sectors like agriculture,
but flexibility in dealing with various trade sectors in meeting this goal.  Action plans were tabled at the
Manila Ministerial in November 1996 for implementation beginning in 1997.  Peer pressure would be
the vehicle for ensuring comparability in commitments among the 18 economies.  Members would
pursue Aconcerted unilateral liberalization@, but in consultation with and under the scrutiny of other
members.   Action plans would be updated and revised periodically at the annual Ministerial meetings.
With regard to agriculture,  these initial action plans in some cases offered accelerated or
broader implementation of commitments agreed to under the Uruguay Round Agreement.  For
example, Australia agreed to complete the reduction of bound rates for agricultural products by
January 1999 instead of 2000.   China, not a member of the WTO, but quite active in APEC,
announced at the last APEC Ministerial in Vancouver that it would make significant tariff cuts on
industrial and agricultural products by 2005.  Other economies promised to accelerate trade-facilitating
measures that would enhance food and agricultural trade such as liberalization of foreign investment in
the transportation sector (Chile) and in expediting inspection procedures for highly perishable trade
(South Korea).
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What is Aopen regionalism@?--The APEC plan for regional free trade is distinguished  from
other regional trade liberalization efforts by the ambiguous concept of  Aopen regionalism,@ described in
the report of the APEC Eminent Persons Group in 1993.  This group was commissioned in 1992 to
Aenunciate a vision for trade in the Asia Pacific region...@ and described Aopen regionalism@ in their
recommendations to leaders on regional trade liberalization, later adopted in the Bogor declaration:3
...the [APEC] members would set a goal of  achieving free trade in the region and indicate
that they prefer to do so through further global liberalization but would pursue a regional
path, on a GATT-consistent basis, if the favored strategy were not achievable.  This would
operationalize APEC=s concept of Aopen regionalism@ or Aopen economic association@ in a
new and effective manner.
3 
AOpen regionalism@, according to the report, would Aobviate any charges that [APEC] was
>going regional=,@
4 a particular concern given the inconclusive status of the long drawn-out Uruguay
Round negotiations at that time. 
What are the pros and cons of Aopen regionalism@?--Detractors of APEC=s Aopen
regionalism@ argue that the benefits from APEC liberalization should accrue only to members or  to
non-members who reciprocate with similar liberalization measures.  Their view is that the non-
discrimination principle embedded in the Aopen regionalism@ concept should be applied conditionally
by APEC to avoid the possibility that APEC liberalization would be exploited by Afree riders@, like the
EU.
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Advocates of  Aopen regionalism@  argue that the nation doing the liberalizing is the greatest
benefactor from such action; thus non APEC economies who free ride APEC=s free trade measures by
not offering reciprocal policy reform would not benefit as much as member economies.  Remaining
distortions would hamstring their ability to compete and take advantage of the opportunities in APEC. 
Therefore, what other economies do or do not do is not as important as what APEC members do.  The
APEC forum serves to encourage members to move forward on the Aopen regionalism@ agenda.
Politically, it is viewed by some as naive to think that an economy will undertake liberalization
without reciprocity.  But recent examples suggest that the times may be changing.  New Zealand
unilaterally undertook extensive agricultural policy reforms in 1984.  Left to face the market, New
Zealand farmers, after going through a difficult adjustment period,  have prospered.   The recent Asian
financial crisis also has  demonstrated the importance of an economy=s openness regarding trade,
foreign investment and finance.  The most severely affected economies in Asia were those whose
economies were relatively closed and now face the necessity of unilateral reform to achieve economic
recovery in a globalized world economy.
II. APEC=s Aopen regionalism@ in perspective
Given APEC=s objective of free trade with Aopen regionalism@ and the controversy around this
approach, we evaluate the implications of APEC=s Aopen regionalism@ approach for the U.S. economy and4
agriculture and compare it to two other alternatives: an exclusive APEC free trade area and multilateral free
trade in which non-APEC economies undertake the same reform as APEC members.    How does Aopen
regionalism@ compare with these other approaches with respect to impacts on national welfare
6, trade creation
and diversion, agriculture trade, farm income and prices?  What are the impacts on APEC partners and
economies outside the region?  And what is the distribution of gains and losses across U.S. economic sectors
in general and for  agriculture in particular? The point of departure, the base case, assumes full
implementation of  the Uruguay Round, the NAFTA Agreement, and the 1996 FAIR Act.  The reform
scenarios assume eventual elimination of tariffs and some non-tariff barriers as well as export subsidies. 
Elimination of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) is assumed to be a part of the base case for WTO members
and is eliminated in the case of the non-WTO members in the three liberalization scenarios [see the Box for
details about the model and assumptions]. 
Welfare rises regardless of liberalization approach.   The results from the recursive dynamic CGE
analysis show that with all three liberalization approaches--an exclusive free trade area, open regionalism,
and multilateral free trade--the overall welfare impacts are positive and vary in magnitude, with global gains
smallest for the APEC free trade area option and largest for multilateral free trade (figure 1).  The Aopen
regionalism@ option is in the middle.  However, the increases in welfare in the United States and the rest of
APEC from Aopen regionalism@ are less than both the free trade area and multilateral options (figure 2). 
According to the simulation results, APEC welfare rises $144-197 billion above baseline levels for the three
options in 2010 [.64 to .88 percent increase]  and from $238 to $363 billion  in 2020 [.78 to 1.19 percent
increase] (figure 3).  The jump between 2010 and 2020 is explained by reducing the higher protection  levels
in the developing APEC economies and the liberalization-induced higher rates of economic growth from 2010
to 2020. The range of our welfare estimates are somewhat larger than  results ($130-300 billion) from
various other APEC free trade simulations using similar policy coverage because of the dynamic features of
our model which account for the accumulating effect of rising incomes and investment levels from trade
liberalization.
7   Nevertheless, our results show that the percentage welfare gains for APEC and the world are
still modest (table 3).
Agriculture makes major contribution to overall gains in three alternatives.  According to the
results, agriculture contributes 55 to 70  percent of total welfare gains from liberalization of merchandise
trade in APEC.  For the United States, the share is even higher, 75 to 85 percent.
8  These results are
consistent with Dee (1997).   The large share from agriculture is explained by  high  initial  protection rates
for food and agriculture products in East Asia; agriculture is a major sector of  unfinished business from the
Uruguay Round (table 2). With the freer play of comparative advantage after APEC trade liberalization, more5
 efficient  resource  allocation across the region will lead to significant increases in import demand for food
and agriculture products, particularly in East Asia.
ROW unable to Afree ride@ on trade expansion from APEC=s Aopen regionalism.@  Exports from
non-APEC economies to the APEC region only increase 4 and 5 percent in 2010 and 2020 ($49 and $87
billion), slower than the APEC to non-APEC export expansion of 9 and 14 percent ($120 and $262 billion)
under Aopen regionalism@ (table 3, right panel).  Total exports for non-APEC economies actually fall except
for slight growth for the EU.  When non-APEC economies liberalize their markets also,  their exports expand
at almost the same rate as in the APEC economies.  The remaining protection in the non-APEC region has a
taxing effect on their own production and exports, thus reducing their competitiveness on world markets in
the Aopen regionalism@ case.  This is an incentive for non-APEC economies to follow APEC=s lead in
liberalizing their own markets.
U.S. agricultural exports rise in all three cases, the least under Aopen regionalism.@  U.S. net 
agricultural exports rise above baseline levels in all three cases, with the multilateral and free trade area
options showing greater benefit than the Aopen regionalism@case (18 to 30 percent higher)(table5).  Australia
and Canada, the other major net agricultural exporters in the APEC region, reflect a similar pattern.  Net
agricultural exporters outside the region benefit from the Aopen regionalism@ option and from the multilateral
liberalization option even more because some important non-APEC economies have relatively more abundant
agricultural land resources than APEC members in East Asia. The free trade area option diverts to APEC
economies about $19 billion in agricultural trade in 2010 and $41 billion in 2020 from outside the APEC
region.
U.S. agriculture does better under freer trade conditions regardless of approach.  U.S. farm
production and exports expand  under all three options because of the further realization of comparative
advantage under freer trade conditions.   All sectors of U.S. agriculture expand, with food grain production
expanding the most, more than 20  percent in 2010 and more than 45 percent in 2020, under each of the three
options (table 4).  Feed grain and livestock production expand by similar  rates in both 2010 and 2020.   The
labor-intensive textile and apparel and light manufacturing sectors decline by about the same percentage in
2010 and 2020 under all three options.
U.S. farm prices and incomes rise.  U.S farm prices rise under all three option in both 2010 and
2020.  U.S. farm income also rises because of higher prices and more efficient use of production resources
(figure 4).
III. Conclusions and policy implications
It may be too early to assess APEC=s bold free-trade plan.  It still remains a plan with  distant target6
dates and uncertain implementation.  However, the plan clearly puts APEC in a potentially more visible role
in encouraging future regional integration in the Pacific Rim. 
It is also apparent from the empirical assessment that all three options  raise global and U.S. welfare
above baseline levels.  The multilateral option is the best from both a global and U.S. perspective.  The Aopen
regionalism@ approach is second best for global welfare, but the least attractive for the United States. 
However, the differences in the welfare gains for the United States from the three options are not large.  The
impacts of the three options on U.S. agriculture also vary but are not large.
Ironically, the least attractive economic option for the United States, Aopen regionalism@, may be the
best when both economics and politics are considered.   Economically, its benefit is not much less than the
other two and the adjustment cost to the U.S. economy is almost the same.   Politically, Aopen regionalism@
has the advantage of  being non-discriminatory with regard to non-APEC members, a more acceptable, less
threatening option from the perspective of the non-APEC world.  It also has the advantage of being an
agreement that would involve only 18 parties, not 132 as would be the case of multilateral liberalization
under the auspices of the WTO.
A key point is that  the Aopen  regionalism@ case assumes that the rest of the world does not offer 
reciprocal reforms.  This assumption is used for convenience to highlight the differences  in the three options.
 In reality, it is likely  that as APEC pursues a course of  Aopen regionalism,@ the rest of the world would not
stand still and free ride, given the widespread interest of many countries to participate in more open global
markets.  According to the simulation results,  the non-APEC economies are unable to take advantage of free
access to the APEC region because remaining distortions in their own markets act as a tax, limiting 
production efficiency  and reducing exports.  Non-APEC economies have a compelling incentive to follow the
lead of APEC in liberalizing their own markets if they want to remain competitive with the APEC economies.
 Therefore, the United States under Aopen regionalism@ might even be better off than our results indicate
depending on  the policy response from the non-APEC world.  This analysis suggests that APEC Aopen
regionalism@ could very well be a vehicle for promoting not only regional but global free trade as well.
Finally, the results also point out the critical role of agriculture policy reform to the overall gains in
welfare in the APEC region, particularly for the United States.  Without liberalization in the region=s
agriculture, the United States would have much less incentive to participate in APEC=s overall liberalization
program7
                                                
Endnotes
1.  Russia, Vietnam, and Peru will be joining in 1998, making 21 economies the total membership.
2. Unpublished memorandum by Jeff Clark, ERS, January 5, 1996.
3. Report of the Eminent Persons Group to APEC Ministers, A Vision for APEC, Towards an Asia
Pacific Economic Community, October 1993, pp 27-28.
4. Ibid., p. 28.
5. Trade Policy Forum, Asia-Pacific and Western Hemisphere Regional Initiatives: Cooperation for
Increasing Competition, Background Paper for Experts Roundtable,  Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council, 12th General Meeting, Santiago, Chile, Sept. 29, 1997, p. 17.
6. We measure changes in national welfare by changes in household consumption, evaluated at base
year prices.
7.  Peter A. Petri, Computable General Equilibrium Studies of APEC: Preliminary Review, unpublished
paper distributed at the PECC XII meeting in Santiago, Sept. 29, 1997.
8. Based on additional simulation which decomposes the welfare contribution from agriculture.8
                                                                                                                                                          
The Model and Assumptions Behind the Results
To estimate the impact of APEC trade liberalization on U.S. agriculture and trade, we used a recursive dynamic computable general
equilibrium model of world production and trade. The model divides the world into 12 regions, and classes all goods and services into
12 sectors, produced by five production factors--agricultural labor, unskilled labor, skilled labor, land and capital.
There are four sources of economic growth in the model: labor force growth, accumulation of physical capital, changes in the skill
composition of the labor force,  and total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
The labor force growth rate is set exogenously. It was calculated from the International Labor Office=s population and labor force
projections from 1990 to 2020, which take the demographic structure and labor force participation rates into consideration.
Capital stock in each simulation period equals the last period’s capital stock plus total investment minus depreciation. No optimal
behavior is assumed for investment and capital accumulation. All net investments in the previous period are assumed to become new
production capital in the next period.
Agricultural labor and urban unskilled labor are not substitutable in production, but linked by rural-urban migration flows, which are
endogenous in the model and driven by the rural-urban wage differential and structural changes in production and trade. The increase
in the skilled labor force is based on the growth in the stock of tertiary educated labor in each region estimated by the World Bank
(Ahaja and Filmer, 1995), which provides an indication of changes in the numbers of those qualified for employment as professional
and technical workers.
TFP growth rates are obtained from econometric estimates by the World Bank ( Martin and Mitra, 1996).
The major data source for the model is the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, version 3. The model was implemented in
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software. Detailed description of the structure and algebraic specification of the model
can be found in Wang (1997a).
Four scenarios are simulated by the model. In the base scenario, the world economic growth path from 1992 to 2025 is generated,
driven by the four sources of growth, assuming full implementation of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, and that China and Taiwan
do not participate in the Uruguay round liberalization process.  For the baseline domestic agricultural support in the United States is
assumed to be reduced by 95 percent as a result of the provisions of the 1996 FAIR Act and domestic support in other OECD
countries and newly industrialized Asia is assumed to be lowered by 40 percent.
Three scenarios are compared with the base scenario: an APEC free trade area (FTRA),  APEC trade liberalization on an MFN basis,
the case of open regionalism (OPEN), and global trade liberalization under which non-APEC economies undertake policy reform in
the same way as APEC (FULL).  Liberalization means reducing import protection and export subsidies in the developed and newly
industrialized economies [the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Korea, and Taiwan] of APEC to zero by 2010, and removing
all import barriers of all other APEC economies [Mexico, China, and ASEAN] by 2020. China and Taiwan obtain the benefit from
elimination of the MFA since they are not members of the WTO.  The reduction in protection is equally distributed over the
simulation period. All exogenous forces driving economic growth are the same as in the base scenario. The only differences among
the three scenarios and the baseline are changes in each country=s trade policy.
The model is a highly stylized simplification of the world economy that is far from perfect (Wang, 1997b). Liberalization of the
service sector is not modeled.  There  are also uncertainties about the size of parameters, such as elasticities of substitution and initial
rates of protection. Therefore, the numbers reported in this paper need to be interpreted with caution: they can be viewed as indicative
but not as precise forecasts. 9
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The World Bank.Table 1-Factor endowment, intensity, and relative size of model regions, 1992
USA Canada Mexico Japan Australia Korea Taiwan China ASEAN5 EU12 Rest OECD Rest World
GDP and trade flows Billion U.S. dollars
GDP 5671.8 572.3 327.9 3644.9 285.4 307.3 211.5 461.2 389.9 6616.4 900.4 3047.7
Exports 573.8 140.0 56.2 378.4 48.7 83.4 92.0 122.0 176.0 734.0 267.6 453.5
Imports 640.5 144.0 72.7 309.5 52.8 90.2 83.3 141.3 183.2 788.8 254.4 544.6
Relative size in the world Percent
GDP 25.3 2.6 1.5 16.3 1.3 1.4 0.9 2.1 1.7 29.5 4.0 13.6
Exports 18.4 4.5 1.8 12.1 1.6 2.7 2.9 3.9 5.6 23.5 8.6 14.5
Imports 19.4 4.4 2.2 9.4 1.6 2.7 2.5 4.3 5.5 23.9 7.7 16.5
Trade dependence Percent
Exports/Output 10.1 24.5 17.1 10.4 17.1 27.1 43.5 26.5 45.2 11.1 29.7 14.9
Imports/Absorption 11.3 25.2 22.2 8.5 18.5 29.4 39.4 30.6 47.0 11.9 28.3 17.9
Share in world factor endowment Percent
Land 13.4 3.2 1.8 0.3 3.6 0.2 0.1 6.9 4.0 5.9 0.6 60.1
Agricultural Labor 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.1 41.7 6.1 0.8 0.1 49.4
Unskilled labor 8.1 1.0 1.8 4.7 0.6 1.3 0.7 17.7 6.0 11.0 1.1 46.1
Skilled labor 15.7 1.4 1.5 4.2 0.8 0.8 0.4 23.3 3.5 13.6 2.4 32.6
Total labor 5.2 0.6 1.3 2.6 0.4 0.8 0.4 29.4 5.8 6.5 0.8 46.2
Capital 23.3 2.2 1.4 17.5 1.5 1.0 0.6 1.8 1.4 30.6 4.7 14.0
Factor share in value-added Percent
Land 0.3 0.6 2.7 0.8 1.2 5.6 1.9 7.4 6.3 0.4 0.8 2.7
Agricultural Labor 1.3 2.9 4.9 2.3 1.5 5.5 4.8 17.1 7.3 3.5 2.6 7.0
Unskilled labor 33.6 33.2 12.5 41.5 34.7 35.6 45.4 17.8 17.5 39.4 29.4 27.6
Skilled labor 29.2 21.8 14.3 15.2 23.8 8.4 7.4 18.1 8.3 24.8 28.2 13.6
Total labor 64.1 57.9 31.7 58.9 59.9 49.4 57.6 53.0 33.2 67.7 60.2 48.1
Capital 35.6 41.5 65.6 40.3 38.8 45.0 40.5 39.6 60.5 31.9 39.1 49.2
Skill distribution of regional labor force Percent
Agricultural Labor 2.2 3.0 28.7 5.8 4.7 22.6 12.1 65.7 48.8 5.5 5.1 49.5
Unskilled labor 66.8 72.6 59.4 77.8 72.2 67.7 76.9 26.1 45.0 72.9 62.8 43.3
Skilled labor 31.1 24.5 11.9 16.4 23.1 9.7 11.0 8.2 6.2 21.6 32.2 7.3
Annual Wages US$ 1,000 per worker
Agricultural Labor 26.6 38.0 1.6 21.1 10.0 3.3 8.5 0.1 0.4 26.1 23.8 0.4
Unskilled labor 22.0 18.0 2.0 28.2 15.4 7.2 12.6 0.4 0.9 22.3 21.9 1.6
Skilled labor 41.0 35.1 11.3 48.9 33.1 11.8 14.5 1.2 3.2 47.4 41.0 4.7
Average wages 28.0 22.8 3.0 31.2 19.3 6.7 12.4 0.3 0.8 27.9 28.1 1.2
US$ 1,000 per hectare
Average land rent 8.5 7.2 31.1 612.6 6.6 730.6 406.1 28.4 37.5 29.9 74.3 9.1
Percent of capital stock 
Average capital ret 12.1 14.6 19.3 11.2 10.2 17.3 19.4 11.4 20.5 9.7 10.2 14.3
Capital(land)) intensity US$ 1,000 per worker
Capital/labor 128.5 112.0 31.8 191.0 122.4 35.5 44.8 1.8 7.1 135.2 179.1 8.7
Hectares per worker
Land/labor 1.50 3.33 0.80 0.07 6.07 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.41 0.53 0.47 0.76
Relative factor prices Ratio
Rental/wage 0.4 0.6 6.5 0.4 0.5 2.6 1.6 41.3 25.6 0.4 0.4 11.7
Land rent/wage 0.3 0.3 10.5 19.6 0.3 108.5 32.9 102.5 46.7 1.1 2.6 7.5
Rental/land rent 1.4 2.0 0.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.1 1.6
              
Data source: Calculated from the 1992 multi-regional SAM estimated by the author from Version 3 GTAP database (Hertel, 1997) 
                   and additional factor endowment  data collected by the authors (Wang, 1997).Table 2 -  Trade Average Protection Rate Faced by Each Region’s Exports, post UR and NAFTA
Merchandise average Agricultural products Non-agricultural products 
APEC Non-APEC World APEC Non-APEC World APEC Non-APEC World
Percent
United States 9.28 7.53 8.47 60.57 20.8 43.57 4.68 9.32 6.66
Canada 2.64 6.52 3.23 28.09 15.26 24.06 0.8 5.86 1.41
Mexico 3.95 4.94 4.13 32.79 31.63 32.66 2.16 6.22 2.76
Japan 16.32 14.99 15.86 22.89 25.32 23.44 17.69 17.12 17.49
Australia 16.2 8.42 13.77 57.48 17 43.83 3.72 6.4 4.55
Korea 11.42 17.45 13.39 32.14 19.07 29.73 12.32 19.05 14.59
Taiwan 15.71 7.87 13.78 82.67 16.15 79.23 13.81 8.65 12.53
China 12.34 10.96 11.76 59.31 19.51 43.1 9.92 13.76 11.43
ASEAN 5 7.52 12.57 9.4 32.75 27.18 30.12 5.68 13.39 8.23
European Union 7.62 9.77 8.89 30.73 25.25 27.07 9.26 11.27 10.49
Rest of OECD 7.82 3.72 4.55 36.99 31.73 33.47 6.97 3.31 4.03
Rest of World 6.42 7.08 6.77 32.17 32.93 32.67 4.96 3.54 4.23
Data source: Calculated from the 1992 multi-regional SAM estimated by the author from version 3 GTAP  database (Hertel, 1997). 
                   The import protection rates for the food and agricultural sectors in China and South Asia were negative in version 3 GTAP. 
                   They reflected government consumer price subsidies on living necessities in those countries.
                   We eliminated all negative protections and treated them as consumer price subsidies in the global SAM. 
                   Protection  rates for food and agricultural sectors in China and South Asia are based on an earlier version of the GTAP database 
                   except China’s crop sectors, which  are tariff equivalence of non-tariff barriers based on Zhang, et. al., 1997.
Table 3  The Impact of Alternative Scenarios on APEC Trade Liberalization
Real Consumption   Exports
 2010  2020 2010   2020
 FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL
Percent change from base scenario
United States 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.45 0.31 0.51 11.0 13.4 13.6 10.0 11.8 12.2
Canada -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.28 0.16 0.30 1.3 2.7 2.3 0.2 1.8 1.2
Mexico -0.16 -0.32 -0.28 -0.35 -0.60 -0.53 1.4 2.9 2.2 3.6 6.4 5.6
Japan 1.39 1.36 1.68 1.67 1.59 1.99 18.2 16.6 18.6 20.4 18.3 20.6
Australia 0.82 0.49 0.71 1.68 1.09 1.58 9.4 11.1 10.8 7.5 9.5 9.1
Korea 1.59 1.61 2.24 2.04 1.91 3.05 28.7 31.5 33.9 30.5 32.6 37.0
Taiwan 2.14 1.78 1.84 3.11 2.49 2.65 19.0 20.3 20.3 21.2 21.8 22.0
China 1.74 1.86 2.18 1.24 1.54 2.05 29.1 34.6 36.0 47.4 56.0 57.9
ASEAN5 0.23 0.08 0.85 -0.29 -0.35 1.08 6.8 9.2 10.4 17.6 21.8 24.5
APEC 0.71 0.64 0.88 0.89 0.78 1.19 14.1 16.2 17.1 19.5 22.4 23.9
EU -0.07 0.18 0.45 -0.06 0.31 0.86 -1.8 0.7 11.8 -2.5 0.8 12.9
Rest of OECD 0.16 0.47 0.61 0.23 0.76 1.10 -1.7 -1.6 3.6 -2.9 -2.6 2.9
Rest of the World -0.21 0.01 -0.17 -0.31 0.14 -0.51 -2.9 -0.7 16.5 -3.5 -1.0 30.9
Total 0.33 0.41 0.58 0.41 0.54 0.77 7.2 9.2 15.1 10.2 13.0 22.3
Table 4  Impact of Alternative Scenarios on APEC Trade Liberalization on Structure of U.S. Economy
Real Consumption   Production
 2010  2020 2010   2020
 FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL
Percent change from base scenario
Food grains 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 29.4 20.0 24.6 55.8 44.8 49.5
Feed grains 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.8 8.1 10.3 6.6 6.2 7.1
Non-grain crops 0.20 0.61 0.54 0.03 0.43 0.37 11.0 6.7 22.6 22.0 17.3 32.1
Livestock products -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.15 -0.10 -0.11 10.9 6.8 9.4 11.9 6.8 10.1
Processed food 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.22 1.5 1.5 2.4 1.6 1.3 3.6
Agriculture 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.14 7.0 4.7 8.1 9.7 6.9 11.1
Forestry and fishery 0.21 0.15 0.29 0.59 0.43 0.69 1.4 1.7 1.7 0.9 1.3 1.6
Mining 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.2 2.6 -0.1 -2.4 1.3 -3.4
Energy 0.05 -0.18 0.11 0.45 0.05 0.69 0.2 0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.5
Textile and apparel 5.20 5.77 5.99 7.70 8.30 8.82 -16.2 -17.3 -17.3 -20.9 -21.9 -22.0
Other light manufactur 0.71 0.75 0.93 1.34 1.30 1.66 -0.8 -1.1 -1.4 -1.6 -2.0 -2.5
Durable goods 0.29 0.24 0.34 0.56 0.45 0.66 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -1.2 -1.4 -1.4
Services -0.06 -0.19 -0.09 0.17 -0.02 0.15 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7
Total 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.45 0.31 0.51 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3
Table 5  Impact of Alternative Scenarios in APEC Trade Liberalization on U.S. Food and agricultural Trade
Real exports   Real Imports
 2010  2020 2010   2020
 FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL FTRA OEPO GLOBAL
Percent change from base scenario
Food grains 46.3 31.2 36.2 76.1 61.2 67.1 6.9 5.3 6.0 20.7 17.5 19.3
Feed grains 11.3 15.2 25.8 -2.3 6.1 9.9 -2.7 -12.8 -9.2 5.7 -10.3 -7.1
Non-grain crops 43.0 41.0 53.6 57.1 52.3 61.8 44.7 72.5 76.6 59.6 83.4 91.5
Livestock products 93.2 66.2 76.7 78.8 50.4 61.8 9.8 28.3 24.7 12.8 30.5 26.1
Processed food 9.5 11.5 17.2 9.9 9.5 24.5 6.1 6.7 11.4 12.4 11.9 18.3
Agriculture 39.5 33.6 42.9 44.2 37.0 47.3 19.3 32.4 35.1 27.1 37.7 42.2
Forestry and fishery 12.3 15.5 16.5 10.1 14.3 17.2 1.4 1.6 2.8 2.9 2.6 4.0
Mining 2.5 11.3 5.8 -1.0 10.0 2.9 2.0 -1.0 3.2 3.9 -0.1 7.3
Energy 4.4 11.1 8.5 2.1 10.1 4.7 1.9 -1.1 3.3 4.5 0.1 8.6
Textile and apparel 11.3 15.6 19.9 1.5 5.0 13.1 39.9 44.1 45.6 47.4 51.1 53.9
Other light manufactur -0.2 0.0 -3.0 -4.8 -4.9 -9.9 9.2 10.9 12.1 13.4 14.9 17.1
Durable goods 9.8 12.4 12.3 6.3 8.4 8.3 13.4 16.2 16.9 14.9 17.1 18.8
Services 1.4 7.0 3.2 -2.2 4.9 -0.2 0.4 -3.6 -0.8 3.2 -2.1 1.5
Total 11.0 13.4 13.6 10.0 11.8 12.2 12.8 14.5 16.1 15.2 16.0 18.9